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Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 12:45:53AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> This summary is completely wrong for any Condorcet scheme.


By definition, any member of the smith set is a plausible winner of
a vote.  So there's no way to show an implausible winner, if we've
restricted the discussion to the smith set.

My original observation about Smith/Condorcet winds up meaning that
Smith/Condorcet penalizes supermajority a bit more than the current
constitution.  But you're right, I can't call that implausible.


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