Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > > 10 : 0 B:C
> > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > > B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A >
> > > B, 3.3 to 0 and A > C, 3.3 to 0). The strengths of the victories don't
> > > come into play unless you have a cycle.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:00:04AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 11:06:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Err, no you weren't...
> (You only ever ignore preferences when there's a cycle involed, which there
> isn't in the above)
Mechanism.. how do I explain that I'm talking about the
Try this on for size: If the first preference would lose against the
second preference when opinion is unanimous, it's not reasonable to
use that mechanism in more complicated circumstances.