Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > 10 : 0 B:C
> > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A >
> B, 3.3 to 0 and A > C, 3.3 to 0). The strengths of the victories don't
> come into play unless you have a cycle.
I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism.