Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:31:13AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > > > > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > > > > > 10 : 0 B:C
> > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > > > > > B wins.
This summary is completely wrong for any Condorcet scheme.
A dominates B (by a reduced margin of 3.3 to 0 rather than 10 to 0)
A dominates C (also by a reduced margin)
B dominates C (by its original margin)
A thus wins by dominating all others.
Whatever you're using to declare B the winner above, it's not a Condorcet
The rest of your message, and the conclusion that Condorced+Supermajority
isn't possible is thus invalid.
Anthony Towns <email@example.com> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
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