Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:00:04AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > 10 : 0 B:C
> > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > B wins.
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A >
> > B, 3.3 to 0 and A > C, 3.3 to 0). The strengths of the victories don't
> > come into play unless you have a cycle.
> I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism.
Err, no you weren't...
(You only ever ignore preferences when there's a cycle involed, which there
isn't in the above)
Anthony Towns <firstname.lastname@example.org> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred.
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