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Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)



On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> 10    : 0  B:C
>  3 1/3: 0  A:B
>  3 1/3: 0  A:C
> B wins.

This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A >
B, 3.3 to 0 and A > C, 3.3 to 0). The strengths of the victories don't
come into play unless you have a cycle.

Cheers,
aj

-- 
Anthony Towns <aj@humbug.org.au> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred.

     ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there''
                       -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001

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