Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
- To: Buddha Buck <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Cc: email@example.com
- Subject: Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
- From: Raul Miller <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2000 09:46:00 -0500
- Message-id: <email@example.com>
- In-reply-to: <20001201133814.090301570B@zaphod>; from firstname.lastname@example.org on Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:38:13AM -0500
- References: <email@example.com> <20001130111614.B6656@azure.humbug.org.au> <firstname.lastname@example.org> <20001130140057.B8740@azure.humbug.org.au> <email@example.com> <firstname.lastname@example.org> <20001201133200.E27397@azure.humbug.org.au> <email@example.com> <firstname.lastname@example.org> <20001201133814.090301570B@zaphod>
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:38:13AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
> Condorcet Criterion: If there is an undefeated option (in pairwise
> contests), that option should be the winner.
> Smith Criterion: The winner should come from the Smith set. The Smith
> Criterion implies the Condorcet Criterion, because if there is an
> undefeated option, the Smith set consists solely of that option.
> Do you have a problem with these criteria in NON-Supermajority
I agree with the Smith Criterion. I'm not sure I understand
enough about what's meant by "pairwise contests" to agree with
the Condorcet criterion.
> In a Supermajority situation, the big question becomes: What does a
> "supermajority" mean in a multi-option election? In a single-option
> election, it's easy: More "yeas" than "nays" by a supermajority. I
> can even see that extended to an Approval voting system: an option
> -can- win by a N:M supermajority if the ratio of "Approved" votes to
> "Not approved" votes is at least N:M. This leads to another possible
> Supermajority Criterion: If any option requires a N:M supermajority,
> then if more than M/N of the ballots disapprove of the option, then it
> should not win.
> Does that sound reasonable? Please keep in mind that I haven't defined
> what "approved" and "disapproved" means on a preferential ballot.
Exactly. Those definition would have to be nailed down before it would
be reasonable to agree or disagree on this.
> How about this Supermajority Election proceedure:
> 1) Find a winner using some method that meets both the Smith and
> Condorcet Criteria (exact method still under debate).
Heh.. this procedure is already debatable.
> 2) If the winner has a supermajority requirement, compare the winner
> with the "status quo" option. If it defeats the status quo by the
> supermajority requirement, then it wins, otherwise "default" wins.
I dislike this, immensely.
What if you have more than one flavor of "status quo" you're voting