On 24/12/21 5:03 am, Curt wrote:
The tools listed in the intercept article don't allow interception of actual voice calls. They are intended to perform traffic analysis and test functions.It wasn't really that "rhetorical" a van because it was precisely the very concrete "mobile FBI van" described on the Wikipedia page the OP referenced. As for the accurate representation of reality, I'm afraid we can only hope, however vainly, that people are capable of determining for themselves who might or might not be an expert in the field.https://theintercept.com/document/2015/12/17/government-cellphone-surveillance-catalogue/
Any competent authority would simply get a warrant (or not) and intercept calls at the exchanges. It's very easy and happens all the time. In conflict countries like Syria and Ukraine you can be certain that 100% of call metadata are recorded and a significant fraction, if not 100%, of voice data recorded for future use. It's not a lot of data on the scale of things.
Getting back to the OP, on the scale of likelihood:- zero probability a bad guy was sitting across the street to intercept his phone
- zero probability a carrier exchange was compromised by a non-state actor - moderate probability the financial institution PBX was compromised- good probability the OP computer *could* have been compromised - it's relatively easy but may not have happened
My working theory is the financial institution PBX was compromised and a small percentage of inbound calls intercepted. It was the OP's bad luck to be one of those.
-- Jeremy
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