Re: Secure, Secret, and Publicly Verifiable Voting
On Wed, Mar 09, 2022 at 07:33:05PM +0000, Bill Allombert wrote:
> On Sun, Mar 06, 2022 at 11:26:28AM -0800, Russ Allbery wrote:
> > "Barak A. Pearlmutter" <barak@pearlmutter.net> writes:
> >
> > > In the discussion of the "voting secrecy" resolution, people seem to
> > > have assumed that it is impossible for a voting system to be
> > > simultaneously secure, tamper-proof, have secret ballots, and also be
> > > end-to-end publicly verifiable meaning transparent verification of the
> > > final tally, with voters able to verify that their own vote was properly
> > > counted. (Our current system does not have secret ballots, but does
> > > embody the other properties.)
> >
> > > As it turns out, magic cryptographic fairy dust allows *all* these
> > > properties to coexist. This is not to say that we *should* have secret
> > > ballots. Just that we *could*, without sacrificing transparency etc.
> >
> > This is what the discussion of Belenios is about. It's a voting system
> > that makes better use of cryptographic fairy dust than what we're
> > currently using.
>
> As I understand, Belenios does not make much of a difference compared to
> the system used for DPL election.
> It does not provide plausible deniability.
> It mostly reduce the trust needed to be put on the secretary, but this
> is not why this GR was proposed.
It's my understanding that Belenios provides universal verifiability
and eligibility verifiability, which is something we don't have now,
and instead have to trust the secretary.
Reducing the need for trusting the secretary is at least one of the
reasons why I would like to move to a different voting system. The
other reason is how difficult it is for people to use the current
system.
This GR is not about changing the voting system, but at least one
of the options is about making it possible to do so.
Kurt
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