Secure, Secret, and Publicly Verifiable Voting
In the discussion of the "voting secrecy" resolution, people seem to
have assumed that it is impossible for a voting system to be
simultaneously secure, tamper-proof, have secret ballots, and also be
end-to-end publicly verifiable meaning transparent verification of the
final tally, with voters able to verify that their own vote was
properly counted. (Our current system does not have secret ballots,
but does embody the other properties.)
As it turns out, magic cryptographic fairy dust allows *all* these
properties to coexist. This is not to say that we *should* have secret
ballots. Just that we *could*, without sacrificing transparency etc.
Some references:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems
* D. Chaum, "Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections,"
in IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 38-47, Jan.-Feb. 2004,
doi: 10.1109/MSECP.2004.1264852.
* https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-future-of-democracy/can-our-ballots-be-both-secret-and-secure
* Josh Daniel Cohen Benaloh. 1987. Verifiable secret-ballot elections.
Ph.D. Dissertation. Yale University, USA. Order Number: AAI8809191.
URL https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/verifiable-secret-ballot-elections/
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