Re: Secure, Secret, and Publicly Verifiable Voting
On Sun, Mar 06, 2022 at 11:26:28AM -0800, Russ Allbery wrote:
> "Barak A. Pearlmutter" <barak@pearlmutter.net> writes:
>
> > In the discussion of the "voting secrecy" resolution, people seem to
> > have assumed that it is impossible for a voting system to be
> > simultaneously secure, tamper-proof, have secret ballots, and also be
> > end-to-end publicly verifiable meaning transparent verification of the
> > final tally, with voters able to verify that their own vote was properly
> > counted. (Our current system does not have secret ballots, but does
> > embody the other properties.)
>
> > As it turns out, magic cryptographic fairy dust allows *all* these
> > properties to coexist. This is not to say that we *should* have secret
> > ballots. Just that we *could*, without sacrificing transparency etc.
>
> This is what the discussion of Belenios is about. It's a voting system
> that makes better use of cryptographic fairy dust than what we're
> currently using.
As I understand, Belenios does not make much of a difference compared to
the system used for DPL election.
It does not provide plausible deniability.
It mostly reduce the trust needed to be put on the secretary, but this
is not why this GR was proposed.
I still consider this GR to be premature.
Cheers,
--
Bill. <ballombe@debian.org>
Imagine a large red swirl here.
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