Re: Secure, Secret, and Publicly Verifiable Voting
"Barak A. Pearlmutter" <barak@pearlmutter.net> writes:
> In the discussion of the "voting secrecy" resolution, people seem to
> have assumed that it is impossible for a voting system to be
> simultaneously secure, tamper-proof, have secret ballots, and also be
> end-to-end publicly verifiable meaning transparent verification of the
> final tally, with voters able to verify that their own vote was properly
> counted. (Our current system does not have secret ballots, but does
> embody the other properties.)
> As it turns out, magic cryptographic fairy dust allows *all* these
> properties to coexist. This is not to say that we *should* have secret
> ballots. Just that we *could*, without sacrificing transparency etc.
This is what the discussion of Belenios is about. It's a voting system
that makes better use of cryptographic fairy dust than what we're
currently using.
--
Russ Allbery (rra@debian.org) <https://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/>
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