Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying

[Markus Schulze <markus.schulze@alumni.tu-berlin.de>]

Dear Raul,

you wrote (25 May 2003):
> On the other hand, if you could show that the May 15 mechanism
> violates monotonicity, then I'd be opposed to it.

Situation 1:

   40 ACB
   32 BAC
   28 CBA

   A:B=40:60
   A:C=72:28
   B:C=32:68

   Default option: A.
   Quorum: 30.

   B meets quorum.
   C fails to meet quorum.
   Manoj's May 15 proposal would choose B.

Situation 2:

   3 ACB voters change their minds to CAB.

   37 ACB
   32 BAC
   28 CBA
   03 CAB

   A:B=40:60
   A:C=69:31
   B:C=32:68

   Default option: A.
   Quorum: 30.

   B meets quorum.
   C meets quorum.
   Manoj's May 15 proposal would choose A.

Markus Schulze