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Re: Anti-malware for my personal Debian workstation?



On Sun, 12 Apr 2020 17:41:54 +0200
<tomas@tuxteam.de> wrote:

> On Sun, Apr 12, 2020 at 10:41:12AM -0400, Celejar wrote:
> > On Sun, 12 Apr 2020 11:37:24 +0300
> > Andrei POPESCU <andreimpopescu@gmail.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > On Du, 12 apr 20, 09:17:18, tomas@tuxteam.de wrote:
> > > > On Sun, Apr 12, 2020 at 09:52:50AM +0300, Andrei POPESCU wrote:
> 
> [...]
> 
> > Interesting discussion. I've looked quickly at the other side [1],
> > however, and there seem to be serious people and arguments in that
> > direction as well. Are they so obviously wrong? [The objection Andrei
> > notes here is specifically countered by the "curl | bash" defenders,
> > although even I can see that the counter is not as strong as the
> > objection.]
> > 
> > [1]
> > https://sandstorm.io/news/2015-09-24-is-curl-bash-insecure-pgp-verified-install
> > https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12766049
> 
> It boils down to whom you trust. Actually the sandstorm page is
> a bit too much marketing-ish for my taste:
> 
>   "Some of the objectors, though, go a bit further: They claim
>    that curl|bash is more open to attack that other distribution
>    mechanisms [...]
> 
>    Of course, all content served by sandstorm.io – from software
>    downloads to our blog – is served strictly over HTTPS [...]"
> 
> They are mixing up the chain of trust up to the distributor (package
> signing) with the transport secutity (HTTPS). Why?
> 
> Remember that nice npm event-stream messup [1]? That's the dark
> side of "iterate faster".
> 
> Trust is a complex beast. At its bottom it can't be completely
> rational, but usually you trust a community because you somehow
> think you understand how it works and you trust the information
> chain linking you to that community.

Exactly. So if I trust the Sandstorm community (for example - I know
nothing about them), then I'm not sure that there's any particularly
great risk in installing their product via "curl | bash", and if I
don't trust them, I shouldn't install their product via any other
mechanism either.

> Cheers
> [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/773121/
> -- tomás


Celejar


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