Re: OT: sorbs blacklisting scam
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1. sender forges address and sends off e-mail
2. intermediary mailserver accepts mail and tries to deliver to
destination
3. destination rejects with temp failure
4. intermediary tries a few more times, and eventually gives up
5. intermediary *generates bounce* to forged sender
...
If the forwarding host and the receiving site are actually part of
the same organisation then they should be trying to push out the
knowledge of users and mailboxes to their edge so that the
forwarding hosts don't have to accept mail they can't/won't deliver.
This argument seems to becoming a religious discussion regarding
point 2.
- - Accepting mails for a domain before know whether the person really
exists.
The mail protocol still allows for this.
Maybe this is something that should at some stage be considered bad
practice?
Many small companies have this problem, ie: protection your MS
Exchange Server
behind a postfix server... How do you want them ALL to fix this?
There are
unfortunately no - out of the box scripts to query your exchange
server and
fill your mail server configs.
There are surely many more reasons that makes disabling feature '2' very
difficult. - But maybe we should work in that direction.
I hope the people from SORBs are reading this list and that they too are
thinking about how to solve the problem, and not add to it.
The times I have had this problem, I have spoken to the admins of the
sites
using <generic>RBL and informed them of the problem. If they want
Internet
Connectivity, they need to fix the problem - if not - that's there
problem -
or perhaps tell their customers to get free mail addresses somewhere
else
until they have! :-)
Regards
Andrew
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