Re: [Debconf-team] Fixing the Debconf Delagation (was: Re: DebConf meetings this week)
Hi,
I think that it's useful to go back to the motivations for the delegation,
and to what is actually written in it. I somehow have the impression
that lots of people are talking about the chairs delegation without
having taken a recent, deep look at it.
You would have to ask Zack for his exact motivations for creating the
role of DebConf chairs (given he wrote the first version of the
delegation[1]), but from my POV as the author of the current text[2],
which is more detailed but - I believe - similar in spirit to Zack's,
the main purpose of the chairs is to provide a safety net around DebConf
organization, so that the project as a whole (and the DPL in particular)
can be confident that in the end, DebConf will happen and be
sufficiently successful for the project's needs.
As a safety net, their role is to "advise", "help", "monitor" (all main
verbs from the delegation itself). They are responsible for the
organization of DebConf, which means that they should feel that it's
their fault when something important fails. This is different from being
*in charge*: it is expected that they will ensure that everything
necessary will happen, but not expected that they will suddenly do
everything. Also, their only real power is the "veto" power when
"a decision taken by the DebConf team is perceived by the DebConf
chairs as creating serious risks for the organization of DebConf or
for Debian".
So in my mind, how this was supposed to work was that the DebConf team
will be organizing DebConf as they wish, while the DebConf chairs will
be around, to advise, watch and ensure and everything goes smoothly.
When the DebConf chairs provide advice/opinions, the DebConf team should
listen, because the DebConf chairs are believed to be clueful about
DebConf, and also because ultimately, the DebConf chairs could veto the
things being discussed. Of course, the veto power is a nuclear bomb,
and should never be used.
My motivation for keeping this quite strange role is that I believe that
(1) it's important to have the main organizers (the DebConf team) be in
charge, to keep them motivated
(2) it's important to maintain a stable monitoring structure, because we
have had many different DebConf teams over the years, and it's not
always easy to trust them fully, right from the start of the process
(3) it's a quite specific task in Debian, and also quite time-consuming,
so I don't think that the DPL should do that work directly
With the current models, ideally, the Chairs would:
- have huge experience about organizing DebConf
- not be too involved in the organization of the current DebConf(s),
so that there's no conflict between opinions expressed a mere organizer,
and opinions expressed as a chair
- aim at the suitable mix between providing too much advise, and letting
the orga team decide
I haven't followed the current debate closely, so I won't comment on any
specifics, except:
On 23/09/15 at 13:15 +0100, Philip Hands wrote:
> I think this is a symptom of a problem that is actually built into the
> current delegation.
>
> The delegation for the chairs only really provides one routinely usable
> power: The power to rearrange teams
That is not part of the current delegation. What is in the delegation is
that the Chairs should "help the DebConf team define [...] a structure
(such as defining sub-teams and the responsibilities of different roles)
[...]." That's quite different.
> The other (more exceptional) power that the chairs have to interfere
> with day-to-day affairs is also problematic: overriding decisions
>
> While this is only used rarely,
Actually, the value of that power is that it exists. But I don't think
that it has ever been used.
> the fact it exists undermines the
> authority of those that really ought to have the right to make
> day-to-day decisions.
Clearly, if day-to-day decisions are being overriden, it's a big
problem.
> It would be much more healthy for the DPL's delegates to have the right
> to give their blessing to the leader(s) that naturally emerge each year,
> and in-extremis to withdraw that blessing if poor decisions are being
> made and advice rejected, but not the right to override individual
> decisions.
Well, then you probably don't need the Chairs as intermediates here: the
DPL could delegate the leader(s) directly, with much broader powers.
Are we ready to do that? Maybe. A possible implementation could be that
bids would come up with a 'DebConf organization bureau' they are
comfortable with, and that the convincing bureau would be part of the
overall evaluation by the DebConf committee.
[1] https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2011/03/msg00005.html
[2] https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2015/05/msg00002.html
- Lucas
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