Re: current A.6 draft [examples]
Raul Miller wrote:
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
In any case, later on I'll define another criteria in my opinion an
election system should follow, and will attempt to prove that CCSSD
(and newly defined DPCCSSD) does follow and the Dec 7 draft does not.
This criteria 'Consistancy', is basically that if an option wins when
it is not the default option, it should win when it is the default
option.
What's the rationale for this system?
Assuming that the default option is the status quo, that is, the
currently selected option.
And assuming that an option winning an election makes it the status quo,
and hence the default option.
And assuming the default option should never be determental to the
chances of an option winning.
Take this scenario. There is an election X, with default option A, that
B wins. Then immediatly after there is election Y, identical to election
X except for the fact that the new default option is B. In this case, B
should win.
In other words, if an option wins when it isn't the default option, then
it should win when it is the default option, everything else being equal.
The Dev 7 draft did not satify consistancy for non-supermajority
elections, as it gave different results.
Your new "Hybrid Theory" draft does satisfy consistancy for
non-supermajority elections, as it does not treat the default option
specially, and behaves as far as I can tell like standard CSSD and my
CCSSD proposal. Which is better than the Dec 7 draft.
---
Raul Miller wrote:
In other words, you're stipulating that for an election where A has 3:1
supermajority, and D is the default option, and the votes are
100 ABD
35 BAD
that B should win, even though every voter considers A to be an
acceptable
option. Why is this a good idea?
Consider this election. Using the draft you proposed in your "Hybrid
Theory" post.
A has 10:1 supermajority. D default.
60 AD
40 DA
Here, D wins obviously.
Assume that A supporters would like A to win, and a prepared to vote in
a matter that achieves that goal, including insincerely.
Assume that D supporters vote sincerly.
A supporters propose option B, where option B is weak and non-sencial,
like, "Debian should jump on three feet".
A new election results.
A has 10:1 supermajority. D default.
60 BAD (the A voters insincerely rank B)
40 DAB
D defeats A (400:60) (due to supermajority).
B defeats D (60:40)
B defeats A (60:40)
B > D > A
B wins.
Assume that B is now the status quo, and hence the default option for
any future election.
The A supporters call another election, shifting their preference for B
around for their own benefit.
B default.
60 ADB (now sincerly ranking B)
40 DAB
A defeats B (100:0)
D defeats B (100:0)
A defeats D (60:40)
A > D > B
Draft: A wins.
CCSSD: D wins.
60% of voters, namely the A supporters, using strategy, have elected an
option with a 10:1 supermajority requirement.
I personally don't think this is enough protection against 10:1
supermajorities.
A method which treats the default option differently to other
non-default options when determining supermajority defeats probably will
be able to be exploited in this manner.
(1) Majority (not supermajority) elects weak non-supermajority option.
(2) Majority (not supermajority) calls another election and superdefeats
the weak non-supermajority option.
My proposed CCSSD prevents this exploit by requiring supermajorities to
super(challenge/defeat) all non-supermajority options (including the
real, strong option), hence making makes supermajority protection real,
not just an inconvenience.
---
Clinton
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