Re: current A.6 draft [examples]
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> > with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:40:21AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> That's not what's important: by his rules some elections that _meet_
> quorum don't have a "democratic" outcome. The quorum issue's irrelevant.
ax·i·om NOUN: 1. A self-evident or universally recognized truth; a maxim:
.It is an economic axiom as old as the hills that goods and services
can be paid for only with goods and services. (Albert Jay Nock). 2. An
established rule, principle, or law. 3. A self-evident principle or
one that is accepted as true without proof as the basis for argument;
a postulate.
An axiom is something which we must accept as unconditionally true.
An "axiom" which is not unconditionally true is not an axiom.
It's not fair to base an argument on an axiom which is known to be false.
The argument may be perfectly well formed, but if the underlying axioms
are not unconditionally true the argument itself is meaningless.
If you want to supply another set of axioms and another [perhaps extremely
similar] proof, that would be fine.
The clause I would add to his axioms, to make them always true, is:
"unless the election is defaulted".
> > The issue here is the impact of transitive defeats. Should options
> > whith supermajority requirements have their votes scaled with respect
> > to options in general or only with respect to the default option?
>
> Well, you're applying transitivity to "D defeats A" -- but remember, D
> *didn't* actually defeat A -- most people actually preferred A to D. Is
> it really fair to extend that "false-defeat" to let D defeat B as well,
> in direct contradiction to what the voters actually said?
Let's take the example you proposed in
http://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2000/debian-vote-200011/msg00203.html
and examine its outcome using Clinton's
proposed resolution system as defined in
http://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2002/debian-vote-200212/msg00020.html
The ballot has options A, B and F, A has a supermajority requirement
of 3:1, B has a 1:1 majority requirement and F is the default option.
60 voters vote ABF
40 voters vote BAF
10 voters vote F
B defeats F by 100 (100:10)
A defeats F by 100 (100:10)
A defeats B by 60 (60:40)
A does not superchallenge B, so it's not considered and B wins.
> > > Which is to say that "if option X doesn't defeat the default option by
> > > its supermajority requirement, it is ignored" seems to be fairer than
> > > considering defeats by the default option as especially strong.
> > Define "fairer" -- the definition of "fair" is the crux of this issue.
>
> That's easy: most in line with what the voters actually want.
And what does "most in line" mean in the context of:
* multiple elections [which may change the rules about how votes are
conducted] and/or
* elections which have supermajority requirements [which is a way
we reduce the risk of changes in the rules by which we determine
fairness]?
Thanks,
--
Raul
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