Re: GRs, irrelevant amendments, and insincere voting
Branden Robinson <branden@debian.org> writes:
> I *am* making the assumption that a signficant number of voters will, even
> within a slate of options preferred over the do-nothing default, vote
> conservatively.
>
> I ground this on the observation that it's a small number of "movers and
> shakers" (or "activists") that effectuate change in a system, even when
> those changes are perceived by the electorate to promote the common
> weal.
>
> So, I am assuming the typical non-activist voter will think "Well, gosh,
> all of these good, and look like at least a marginal improvement over
> the status quo, but in case I'm wrong I'll rank the least disruptive
> options higher".[1]
OK, is there any voting system which would prevent this? You could
even argue that the electorate just gets what it wants in the case
you describe. Do you want to prohibit proposing amendments at all?
If you don't, you need some mechanism to choose among incompatible
amendments, and if a majority of voters prefers to stay very close
to the status quo, the more "revolutionary" options will always be
defeated. I don't think this has anything to do with Condorcet and
supermajority requirements, but probably you did not mean to imply
that.
> If someone can make a good case that my premises above are invalid, then
> I invite them to go ahead in this sub-thread. I'd be quite relieved if
> our system cannot be "gamed" in the manner I fear.
I would make the case that every sane voting system is susceptible
to this kind of "gaming", and I would even say that if it did not,
the voting system would be unfair, as the intent of the electorate
in your scenario is to make as little change as possible. If there
is a problem with the "6 friends" obstructionism, it seems to be a
matter of developer psychology, not voting systems. It may be that
I completely misunderstood your objections, please correct me if I
did.
Cheers,
Lukas
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