Re: GRs, irrelevant amendments, and insincere voting
On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 01:10:51PM -0500, Branden Robinson wrote:
> (Or: How You and Five of Your Friends Can Kill Any GR)
>
> On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 04:04:05PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > Does Branden's pass the supermajority clause? If not, it presumably
> > wouldn't if reasked anyway, and it fails.
>
> If it does, and is reasked, what's to stop a group of 6 people[1] from
> proposing an "amendment" that guts the original proposal down to nothing
> but uncontroversial cosmetic alterations?
What effect will this cosmetic amendment have on yours? It can only
defeat yours if more people rank it above your amendment than the other
way around, in which case they express a clear preference against your
substantive changes. Also, whether your amendment achieves supermajority
depends only on whether enough people rank it over "further discussion",
and is not affected by how they rank other options.
What kind of interaction do you foresee between them?
> Condorcet's Method is designed to allow voters to express *sincere
> preferences*, but it looks like we might have managed to lose that
> property.
How?
Assume a ballot with these options:
B - Branden's amendment (3:1)
E - Editorial-only amendment (3:1)
N - Don't amend
D - Default option
Can you show a real preference that is best achieved by voting
insincerely?
Richard Braakman
Reply to: