On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 01:16:20PM -0500, Sam Hartman wrote:
> Why do you believe the editorial-only amendments will be ranked above
> the substantive ones?
On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 11:18:26PM +0200, Richard Braakman wrote:
> Can you show a real preference that is best achieved by voting
> insincerely?
On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 04:50:35PM -0500, Anthony DeRobertis wrote:
> Does that really hurt?
[...]
> Now, I can sincerely vote CABZ or CBAZ. I argue that anyone who, in
> this ballot, votes BZCA would of voted ZA on the first ballot.
You all three raised the same point, so I'll reply only once. :)
I *am* making the assumption that a signficant number of voters will, even
within a slate of options preferred over the do-nothing default, vote
conservatively.
I ground this on the observation that it's a small number of "movers and
shakers" (or "activists") that effectuate change in a system, even when
those changes are perceived by the electorate to promote the common
weal.
So, I am assuming the typical non-activist voter will think "Well, gosh,
all of these good, and look like at least a marginal improvement over
the status quo, but in case I'm wrong I'll rank the least disruptive
options higher".[1]
I do admit the possibility that I am misjudging the Debian electorate,
or that I have insufficient experience with Debian's modified
Condorcet/CSSD system[2] to judge its dynamics.
If so, I guess I'll find out, but I am a suspicious person and difficult
to convince. :)
More seriously, that manipulative tactics like the ones I have decribed
may not be used in the vote that will (presumably) follow from my
current RFD doesn't mean they never will.
If someone can make a good case that my premises above are invalid, then
I invite them to go ahead in this sub-thread. I'd be quite relieved if
our system cannot be "gamed" in the manner I fear.
[1] Yes, some people might argue "in that case, you've been
insufficiently persuasive". This isn't a refutation of my argument,
it just flat out ignores my premise -- or, more accurately, it
insidiously *shares* it, because I would expect such rhetoric
to come from the exact same people who would propose fluff
amendments to derail any substative proposal that looks likely to
pass in the absence of those same fluff amendments.
[2] "Default options", "quorum", and "supermajority" requirements are
not native to the Condorcet Method. In fact, IIRC, the Condorcet
Method itself doesn't mandate that there must be only one winner
among a given set of options. When SPI held its last board
election, we used a Condorcet/CSSD system and picked the *three*
most-preferred candidates to fill the three open positions.
--
G. Branden Robinson |
Debian GNU/Linux | If encryption is outlawed, only
branden@debian.org | outlaws will @goH7Ok=<q4fDj]Kz?.
http://people.debian.org/~branden/ |
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