# Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying

```Manoj Srivastava wrote:
>
>
>  Scenario A:
> 	Suppose the tech ctte has 10 members, and is trying to vote on
>  the rainbow vote. The quorum is 4. (If you recall, the rainbow vote
>
> 	All 10 members vote -- and they all like like different
>  colors, except that two people like red. Most are indifferent about
>  the colors they did not chose, but they do not feel they should win
>  -- and express their preferences by either only voting for the color
>  of their choice.
>
> 	In my version, since no option got the needed 4 votes, there
>  is no winner.

Let us compare three ways of counting this exact vote:
1) ``Classic'' Condorcet/Cloneproff SSD, with no quota requirements.
2) The newly proposed scenario.
3) The amended proposed.

under Classic method, Red does win.
under the proposed method, there is no vote.
under the amended proposition, Red wins.

the proposal brings the Quorum voting method back to the Condorcet
standard, while ensuring that a few developers (less that R) cannot make
any ``stealth decisions''.

> 	In this amendment, red wins -- even though only 2 of the 10
>  people voted for it (less than the quorum of 4). Red won, even though
>  8 out of 10 people did not want to see it as winner.

those 8 people did not establish a priority between the remainder, and
as such, were indiferent to the results. if any one of them had marked
red below the rest,, such as 1222222322, then all the colours would have
tied.

> 	Consider the same scenario with 100 voters, quorum 9; and 10
>  voting: even though only 2 people prefer red, it shall win.

this is what the voters had prefered. i fail to see the problem.

> 	Logically, I think, the sheer indifference of the voting
>  population would be better reflected by not selecting a winner.

if you desire more buy-in, change the quota as required. 3*1/2sqrt(100)
is 15.

> Scenario B:
>
> 	Consider the case where the quorum is 45, and there have been
>  44 votes -- 23 for, 21 against. (Only one option on the ballot). I am
>  opposed to the option.
>
> 	At this point; under my version; I can express my opinions
>  with no fear of harming my candidate. Under your amendment; if I do
>  not vote; the vote is nullified. However, if I vote against the
>  option -- the option shall win!!
>
> 	If I do not vote, but some one else opposed to the option
>  votes before the vote ends --- the option wins (even though the vote
>  was against it)!!. If I had voted along with this other person, the
>  vote would have been a draw.
>
> 	So, if two people opposed to the option do not vote; the
>  option loses. If either votes against the option, the option wins --
>  if they both vote against the option, the vote is a draw, and the
>  casting vote, if any, gets to decide.

let us again consider this under the three methods, Classic, Proposed,
and Amended.

Classic:   Proposed:   Amended:
AB
1- x23    A wins     No Vote     No Vote
-1 x21

1- x23    A wins     No Vote     A wins
-1 x22

1- x23    B wins     No Vote     B wins
-1 x24

we can plainly see that the amended version prevents a few voters to
make a decision for the whole, but does allow for the will of sufficient

> 	This fails the Monotonicity Criterion (MC)
>
> 	       Statement of Criterion
>
>                With the relative order or rating of the other
>                candidates unchanged, voting a candidate higher should
>                never cause the candidate to lose, nor should voting a
>                candidate lower ever cause the candidate to win.
>