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Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying

Fellow developers,

I propose the following amendment to the Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote
tallying Constitutional amendment. This amendment supersedes the
amendment proposed in Message-ID: <20030517081720.GC3503@ucsd.edu>

If the sponsor rejects this change, I request seconds on this amendment,
so that it appears on the ballot.

Rationale for change:

   The amendment uses the concept of a Quorum requirement to inhibit
   "stealth decisions" by only a handful of developers. While this is a
   good thing, the per-option quorum from the amendment has a tendency to
   further influence the outcome of the vote in a hard-to-understand
   way. This modification corrects this deficiency.

   An easy example: a ballot with two items plus the default item.
   Quorum is 20, with 25 eligible voters voting.

   A B D   # of ballots cast
   2 1 3    15
   1   2    10

   Here, option B is preferred over option A by the voters. Under the
   original proposal, Option B would be discarded due to insufficient
   quorum requirements, and A would win. Under the amended proposal,
   option B would win.

Please join the discussion on debian-vote.

John H. Robinson, IV
jaqque () debian () org
--- proposal-srivasta	Fri May 16 09:42:59 2003
+++ proposal-jaqque	Mon May 19 11:43:13 2003
@@ -1,139 +1,139 @@
  Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD  vote tallying:
 Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
 election], change item 3 to read:
     3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes, tallies, and
        results are not revealed during the voting period; after the
        vote the Project Secretary lists all the votes cast. The voting
        period is 2 weeks, but may be varied by up to 1 week by the
        Project Leader.
 Under 5.2 Appointment of project leader, change item 7 to read:
     7. The decision will be made using the method specified in section
        A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.  The quorum is the
        same as for a General Resolution (s.4.2) and the default
        option is "None Of The Above".
 Under 6.1 Powers [of the technical committee], change item 7 to read:
     7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee.  The Chairman
        is elected by the Committee from its members. All members of
        the committee are automatically nominated; the committee votes
        starting one week before the post will become vacant (or
        immediately, if it is already too late). The members may vote
        by public acclamation for any fellow committee member,
        including themselves; there is no default option. The vote
        finishes when all the members have voted, or when the voting
        period has ended. The result is determined using the method
        specified in section A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.
 Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change items 2 and 4 to read
     2. The proposer or any sponsor of a resolution may call for a vote on that
        resolution and all related amendments.
     4. The minimum discussion period is counted from the time the last
        formal amendment was accepted, or since the whole resolution
        was proposed if no amendments have been proposed and accepted.
 Replace A.3 with:
   A.3. Voting procedure
     1. Each resolution and its related amendments is voted on in a
        single ballot that includes an option for the original
        resolution, each amendment, and the default option (where
     2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
        Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
        have a 1:1 majority requirement.
     3. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6.  The
        default option is "Further Discussion", unless specified
     4. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
        of procedure.
 Replace A.5 with:
   A.5. Expiry
    If a proposed resolution has not been discussed, amended, voted on or
    otherwise dealt with for 4 weeks the secretary may issue a statement
    that the issue is being withdrawn.  If none of the sponsors of any
    of the proposals object within a week, the issue is withdrawn.
    The secretary may also include suggestions on how to proceed,
    if appropriate.
 Replace A.6 with:
    A.6 Vote Counting
      1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on.  Not all
         options need be ranked.  Ranked options are considered
         preferred to all unranked options.  Voters may rank options
         equally.  Unranked options are considered to be ranked equally
         with one another.  Details of how ballots may be filled out
         will be included in the Call For Votes.
-     2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other
-        than the default option which do not receive at least R votes
-        ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
+     2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R, and less then R votes are
+        cast, the entire vote is thrown out.  The amendment may be withdrawn,
+        or a discussion period may be resumed at the sponsor's discretion.
+     3. Any option with a supermajority requirement which does not defeat
+        the default option by its required majority ratio is dropped from
-     3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
-        by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
         a. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
            who prefer option A over option B.
         b. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
            ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
         c. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio
-           is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
+           is S.
      4. From the list of undropped options, we generate a list of
         pairwise defeats.
         a. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictly greater
            than V(B,A).
      5. From the list of [undropped] pairwise defeats, we generate a
         set of transitive defeats.
         a. An option A transitively defeats an option C if A defeats
            C or if there is some other option B where A defeats B AND
            B transitively defeats C.
      6. We construct the Schwartz set from the set of transitive defeats.
         a. An option A is in the Schwartz set if for all options B,
            either A transitively defeats B, or B does not transitively
            defeat A.
      7. If there are defeats between options in the Schwartz set,
         we drop the weakest such defeats from the list of pairwise
         defeats, and return to step 5.
         a. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if V(A,X)
            is less than V(B,Y).  Also, (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) if
            V(A,X) is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than V(Y,B).
         b. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat weaker
            than it.  There may be more than one such defeat.
      8. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
         is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set.  If there is
         only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
         options, the elector with the casting vote chooses which of those
         options wins.  
      RATIONALE: Options which the voters rank above the default option
      are options they find acceptable.  Options ranked below the default
      options are options they find unacceptable.

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