Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying
Raul Miller wrote:
> On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 02:39:08PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> > this is a strawman, because if <R people vote, then no option will
> > achieve the R+1>default per-item quota.
> Expressed in terms of scenario: A vs B, quorum 20
> Case 1:
> 15 ABD
> D wins
15<R. under my amendment, there is no vote. the amendment is either
withdrawn, or resumes further discussion as per the sponsor's
> Case 2:
> 15 ABD
> 8 BDA
> A wins
> Here, the vote(s) for B caused A to win.
these are new votes, not re-ordered existing votes. this does not fail
the Monotonicity Criterion.
under a Classic Condorcet/Cloneproof SSD, both case 1 and case 2 would
have A as the winner.
this is no different than, say, a board meeting vote. if you show up,
then any votes taken are binding regardless if you abstain or not. the
only difference here is that if you vote at all, you are counted has
this is a tradeoff between ``a vote against causes the opponent to win''
and ``stealth decisions by a few developers.'' one way respects the will
of the voters, the other way does not.
my amendment respects the will of the voters. the proposal does not.
> > > To make your proposal work right, we'd need a separate quorum
> > > determination phase which is independent of the voting phase.
> > i fail to see that argument.
> See above.
what would the separate quorum determination determine? when would this
determination take place?