Re: Nov 18 draft of vote counting methodology
I would like to know the result of this ballot.
Where A is default and C requires a supermajority (as far as I can tell
its A, even though B, not needing a supermajority, beat it pairwise).
As far as I can tell, C is the winner of step two, but defeated in step
3 by the default option supermajority veto. So then the default option
gets special treatment and is declared the winner, even though B beats A
Andrew Pilmott has explain it better than me, that any implimentation
that treats default options specially (not supermajority or quorum
requirements, but default options), is bound to have strategy problems,
in this case, introducing option C has caused the C honest C voters to
spoil their second B preference, which wouldn't of happened in a
straight A v B ballot.
When I say that the implimentation shouldnn't treat default options
specially, I mean that if A and B both have no supermajority and quorum
requirements, A should be treated identically to B, regardless of
default option status.
Maybe a concept of a "default group", may help, that being the group of
options without supermajority and quorum requirements. Just a thought.