# Re: Nov 18 draft of vote counting methodology

```On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 01:11:43AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> I would like to know the result of this ballot.
>
> ACB
> ACB
> CBA
> CBA
> CBA
>
> Where A is default and C requires a supermajority (as far as I can tell
> its A, even though B, not needing a supermajority, beat it pairwise).

What supermajority ratio?  2:1?  3:1?  I'll assume 2:1

N(A,B) 2:3 not a defeat
N(A,C) 4:3 A defeats C
N(B,A) 3:2 B defeats A
N(B,C) 0:5 not a defeat
N(C,A) 3:2 C defeats A
N(C,B) 5:0 C defeats B

Every option transitively defeats every other option, so every option
is in the initial schwartz set.

The weakest defeats are (B,A) and (C,A), dropping them, we have

N(A,B) 2:3 not a defeat
N(A,C) 4:3 A defeats C
N(B,A) 3:3 not a defeat
N(B,C) 0:5 not a defeat
N(C,A) 3:3 not a defeat
N(C,B) 5:0 C defeats B

A transitively defeats all other options, and is transitively defeated
by no other options, A wins.  [Technically: there are no votes prefering
A to the default option, so the default option wins -- but that's a
trivial issue.]

> As far as I can tell, C is the winner of step two, but defeated in step
> 3 by the default option supermajority veto.

I don't know why you think this.

--
Raul

```