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Re: Another proposal.

What I've noticed in response to my proposal is that no-one has actually mention my proposal, which is unusual, considering the subject title of the post, but instead have been discussing criteria, such as "whether supermajority votes should be strategy free" as below.

Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> So for example, the clause, in most drafts, that first eliminated
> options that were defeated by the default option, was a direct
> invitation to insincere strategic voting. It would encourage voters
> to put the default option second, in an attempt to knock out the
> other candidates early. Exactly what we're trying to avoid with the
> Condorcet method.

Then Anthony Towns wrote:
> But it's exactly what we're trying to achieve with the supermajority
> requirement, isn't it? Allowing voters to vote strategically so as to
> knock out candidates they don't like?

Personally, I think election methods that encourage and reward strategy (i.e. insencere voting and candidates) are broken and something to avoid, but thats for people to decide.

In any case, a set of critiria must be set before even hoping to design a method.

My method, which I set out in the original post in this thread, and I will replicate at the bottom of this post, trys to meet these three critiria.

1. Strategy Free, as much so as plain CSSD without supermajority and quorum requirements.
2. Repeated elections with identical votes produce identical results.
3. Provides adequte protection for non-supermajority and non-quorum options against options requiring supermajorities and quorums.

If people have a disagreement with the above criteria, please point out the problem with this criteria. But the general opinion I get from this mailing list is that people want a method that is (1) strategy sree, (2) consistent and (3) provides protection for nonisupermajority and non-quorum options against supermajorities.

If my criteria are wrong, please tell me, but if not, to improve it the method, I need someone to show an example which breaks it. I don't mean this as any sort of challenge, its just that the only way I can fix something is by finding out whats broken first.


- Definition: Defeat is the normal defeat, not considering supermajority and quorum requirements.

- Definition: A super-defeat is a defeat after considering supermajority and quorum requirements.

(a) The default option is considered.

(i) If option A has quorum requirements and supermajority requirements less than or equal to option B, and option A defeats option B, then option A is considered.

(ii) If option A super-defeats all options with quorum requirements or supermajority requirements less than option A, then option A is considered.

Perform CSSD on all considered options, ignoring supermajority and quorum requirements.

(Keep a close eye on the or's and and's in the rules in part (b))


Anyway, thanks, and sorry for the minor rant.


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