Re: Another proposal.
What I've noticed in response to my proposal is that no-one has actually
mention my proposal, which is unusual, considering the subject title of
the post, but instead have been discussing criteria, such as "whether
supermajority votes should be strategy free" as below.
Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> So for example, the clause, in most drafts, that first eliminated
> options that were defeated by the default option, was a direct
> invitation to insincere strategic voting. It would encourage voters
> to put the default option second, in an attempt to knock out the
> other candidates early. Exactly what we're trying to avoid with the
> Condorcet method.
Then Anthony Towns wrote:
> But it's exactly what we're trying to achieve with the supermajority
> requirement, isn't it? Allowing voters to vote strategically so as to
> knock out candidates they don't like?
Personally, I think election methods that encourage and reward strategy
(i.e. insencere voting and candidates) are broken and something to
avoid, but thats for people to decide.
In any case, a set of critiria must be set before even hoping to design
My method, which I set out in the original post in this thread, and I
will replicate at the bottom of this post, trys to meet these three
1. Strategy Free, as much so as plain CSSD without supermajority and
2. Repeated elections with identical votes produce identical results.
3. Provides adequte protection for non-supermajority and non-quorum
options against options requiring supermajorities and quorums.
If people have a disagreement with the above criteria, please point out
the problem with this criteria. But the general opinion I get from this
mailing list is that people want a method that is (1) strategy sree, (2)
consistent and (3) provides protection for nonisupermajority and
non-quorum options against supermajorities.
If my criteria are wrong, please tell me, but if not, to improve it the
method, I need someone to show an example which breaks it. I don't mean
this as any sort of challenge, its just that the only way I can fix
something is by finding out whats broken first.
- Definition: Defeat is the normal defeat, not considering supermajority
and quorum requirements.
- Definition: A super-defeat is a defeat after considering supermajority
and quorum requirements.
(a) The default option is considered.
(i) If option A has quorum requirements and supermajority requirements
less than or equal to option B, and option A defeats option B, then
option A is considered.
(ii) If option A super-defeats all options with quorum requirements or
supermajority requirements less than option A, then option A is considered.
Perform CSSD on all considered options, ignoring supermajority and
(Keep a close eye on the or's and and's in the rules in part (b))
Anyway, thanks, and sorry for the minor rant.