On Tue, Sep 17, 2002 at 01:07:59PM -0600, Joel Baker wrote: > Visual identification of the applicant isn't terribly meaningful; all it > establishes is that they have a card with their picture on it. It says > nothing about the veracity of that card, which is where the attack is in > that case. However, see below. Let me put it another way: they can forge their ID, but it's hard to forge their face. With a face-to-face meeting, if the person DOES have ulterior motives, we now have a much better chance of bringing them to justice afterwards than if both their identity and their face were unknown to us. > > Most people don't get signed into the ring by people from far distant > > lands (say, California), either; the web is large enough now that > > familiarity with the IDs of your own state, and possibly your neighboring > > states, should be enough to prevent mere $1,000 forgeries. And when NMs > > can expect to spend maybe half a year in the queue anyway, the > > "reasonable effort" to contact a local DD should include a corresponding > > increase in effort to be considered reasonable. > This, I will grant, with one caveat: the question of whether DDs actually > do know this, and whether they are actively aware of it. They should be - > but are they? (And is this, perhaps, something to be noted in the FAQs, if > not?) Yes, making sure that our developers are well-educated is always a concern. Steve Langasek postmodern programmer
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