Bug#727708: Call for votes on init system resolution
Kurt Roeckx writes ("Bug#727708: Call for votes on init system resolution"):
> I think there are basicly 2 ways to go about this:
> - You revoke your decision during the GR process so that when
> the GR is being voted on your decision no longer applies and
> the GR isn't trying to override the ctte. You could for
> instance do this at the call for votes point.
> - The GR will be with 2:1 majority and if it comes to a decision
> other than FD, that will be the result. If the decision of the
> GR is FD you could go and re-intreprete it with the 2:1 majority
> I suggest you go for the first option.
The Developers have, by way of GR, the ability to express opinions as
a non-binding "position statement on a matter of the day". This
requires a 1:1 majority.
Do you think the Developers lose that ability if their non-binding
position statement expresses views which are contrary to a decision of
the TC ? Or do they lose that ability if their non-binding position
statement express views which are contrary to the decisions of an
individual Developer ? Or if their non-binding position statement
expresses views which are contrary to the decisions of a body outside
Debian over which the Developers obviously have no authority ? Surely
not, to all three of these.
Do you think the TC can take into account, in its decisionmaking, the
non-binding views expressed by bodies such as the Developers in
General Resolution ? I think, yes.
Do you think the TC can make its decisions conditional on future
events ? I think, yes. Is that in any way limited to the kinds of
future events ? I think not.
So, then I think that the TC has the power to make its decisions
dependent on the expression (or lack of expression) of views in a
non-binding position statement General Resolution.
If you agree with this reasoning then I'd be grateful if you'd advise
what form of words should be used to achieve the desired effect. The
desired effect is that:
* A GR option containing a non-binding position statement, requiring
a 1:1 majority, can trigger:
* Provisions in a TC resolution which is conditional on such a GR,
* such that the TC declares in advance that the GR's views are to be
substituted for the TC's.