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Re: Our supermajority requirement has changed !



On Wed, May 26, 2004 at 09:23:53PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Let us suppose that:
> 
>  * There are two voters X and Y, whose real utilities are
>     Voter X:  A=+10 (`Good')    Voter Y:  B=+10
>               B=  0 (`OK')                A=  0
> 	     FD= -5                      FD= -5
>    (Let us neglect the quorum for the moment as I want to have just
>    two voters to simplify the situation.)

FD should be 0 utility.  This doesn't affect things greatly,
but helps keep perspective.  That makes it:
     Voter X:  A=+15 (`Good')    Voter Y:  B=+15
               B=  5 (`OK')                A=  5
 	      FD=  0                      FD=  0

> Here are the possible outcomes seen from X:
> 
>   Payoffs for X    Y votes B:A:FD `cooperate'   Y votes B:FD:A `defect'
>     X cooperates        +5 (50% of +10)            0
>     X defects          +10                        -5

This becomes:

  Payoffs for X    Y votes B:A:FD `cooperate'   Y votes B:FD:A `defect'
    X cooperates       +10 (avg of 5 and 15)      5
    X defects          +15                        0

The same thing, basically, but all outcomes are positive unless both
"defect".

If X wants to minimize potential losses (and X has certain knowledge that
no other votes will be cast), X should cooperate.  

If X has no knowledge how Y will vote (but knows for sure that no one
else will be voting), the potential payoff for X is equal (7.5 with my
numbers, 2.5 with yours) for the "defect" and "don't defect" cases.

> Whether X's best strategy is cooperate depends on whether Y
> cooperates, and X's outcome is mainly controlled by whether Y
> cooperates or not.  If X knows that Y is going to defect then X should
> cooperate.
>
> This is a strange and dysfunctional game if what we want is for people
> to discuss and vote honestly.

I'm not sure I agree.

> The alternative voting system, with the word `strictly' removed, works
> like this:
> 
>   Payoffs for X    Y votes B:A:FD `cooperate'   Y votes B:FD:A `defect'
>     X cooperates        +5                        +5 *
>     X defects           +5 *                      +5 *
> 
> This is much more sensible.  (Entries marked * are ones where the
> chairman could choose FD too.)

I don't see that removing the word "strictly" has this effect at all.

The quorum for committee votes is 2, which means that each option must
receive 2 votes preferring it over the default option or it is ignored.

Furthermore, 1 is not greater than 1 any more than 1 is strictly greater
than 1.  So even without quorum, I don't see any benefit for this
case.

-- 
Raul



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