Re: Draft proposal for resolution process change (v2)
Hi,
thank you Russ for driving this discussion forward. I'm pretty happy
with your proposal.
On Tue, 05 Oct 2021, Russ Allbery wrote:
> I'm somewhat surprised that there has been no discussion of the timing of
> the GR discussion period, which I expected to be more controversial. The
> scheme I'm proposing is relatively complex but allows the discussion
> period to vary from 1 week to 4 weeks based on how much ballot option
> activity there is and based on DPL actions. If anyone is unhappy with
> that (if, for example, you think it's too complex or 4 weeks is too short
> or too long), now would be a good time to bring that up so that we can
> discuss it.
On the topic of the length of the discussion period, your proposal tries
to keep the current spirit while adding some safeguards. I think it's
good.
When I try to think of possible simplifications with a fixed period
of discussion, I end up wanting special cases...
For example, I find a fixed 3 week period very long, but if we opt for
that maybe we can authorize an early call for vote (by one of the proposer
or by the DPL) if no changes to the ballot options happened in the last 5
days. That way if a discussion dies after one week, we can still shorten
it to 2 weeks. In practice, it's realy close to your proposed system with
min and max so in the end I concluded that it's not worth exploring that...
Thus the only simplification that is acceptable to me is possibly to get
rid of the DPL power to vary the discussion period. But then the existence
of min and max period avoids most of the problem that could be introduced
by this power.
I think we should aim at shortening the voting period too, but likely not
by much. I would make the voting period last at least 9 days (and no more
than 14) with a requirement to include two week-ends. Then the secretary
should have some leeway in fixing the start and the end based on his own
availability.
> Here is my current draft:
I saw some interesting discussion about the need to remove the 2:1
majority requirement to overrule the TC in case the decision has been made
with the chair casting vote, but I don't see any language for this.
Is there any reason for this?
Cheers,
--
⢀⣴⠾⠻⢶⣦⠀ Raphaël Hertzog <hertzog@debian.org>
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