Re: GRs, irrelevant amendments, and insincere voting
On Nov 1, 2003, at 22:32, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Ah, but there is a paradox: Consensus on one of the options does
exist. The option just got dropped (failed n:1 requirements) due to
people wanting another option, too. That is, I think, a technical
How the hell would it get dropped if people actually had a
consensus and wanted it?
Given two orthogonal options, A and B, with a 3:1 requirement, and the
default option C:
The true preferences:
A over C: 100
B over C: 90
C over A: 0
C over B: 10
Truly, both should pass, but by putting A and B on the same ballot, one
must be defeated. Some people consider A more important than B; others
consider the opposite to be true. So, let's say:
A over B: 60
B over A: 40
This means A is the ideal democratic winner. It is undefeated. It would
be wrong for it to lose. There is a strong consensus for it --- it's
unanimous.
However, if the people who prefer B over A all vote --- strategically
and insincerely --- ACB, then let's read the Debian Constitution:
A.6.3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default
option by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who
prefer option A over option B.
2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority ratio
N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
V(A,D) = 60
N * V(D,A) = N * 40 = 3 * 40 = 120
V(A,D) > N*V(D,A) ? => no, so drop
That's how a consensus option gets dropped.
Notice that if both sides do that, every supermajority election will
default. Despite unamity. I'm not sure if its fixable, but if it is,
I'd like to help fix it. One thing that comes to mind is that
orthogonal issues should be on separate ballots.
I hope this makes my concern clearer.
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