[Date Prev][Date Next] [Thread Prev][Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]

Re: GRs, irrelevant amendments, and insincere voting



On Sat, Nov 01, 2003 at 09:38:38AM -0500, Anthony DeRobertis wrote:
> On Fri, 2003-10-31 at 23:18, Branden Robinson wrote:
> 
> > I *am* making the assumption that a signficant number of voters will, even
> > within a slate of options preferred over the do-nothing default, vote
> > conservatively.
> 
> Then we can say nothing besides "that is the will of the electorate." 

See my reply to Lukas Geyer for why I think this is a fallacious
conclusion.

> However, even so, that means (given):
> 
> 	Option A: strike SC 5
> 	Option B: trivial, editorial change
> 	Option C: A + B
> 	Option D: Further Discussion
> 
> we're going to get the 'activists' voting CABD and the insecure voting
> BCAD.

No, they might vote BACD because this sorts the substantive options in
increasing order of disruption to the Social Contract.  It is irrational
to rank A above C if you're trying to be "conservative" (but not so
conservative that you rank D first, saying "damn all changes")?

(Of course, this presumes that "conservatives" act rationally, which
I admit is ill-supported by observation.)

> The insecure won't vote against (rank below default) the real
> changes if they like them[1]. So, as long as there are sufficient
> 'activists', I conclude[2] that C will still win.

Hmm.  If my scenario is correct, B wins because the activists ranking C
above A are cancelled by the insecure moderates ranking A above C.

So B might win, validating the utility of the manipulative strategy.

> I fear the alternative is to have someone arbitrarily refuse to put
> options on the ballot, and that that would prevent free and fair
> elections.

Well, not necessarily, but it's certainly an awesome power that could be
awesomely abused.

> Condorcet can give an arbitrary number of winners. Cloneproof SSD
> attempts to resolve that. Cloneproof SSD is _supposed_ to be essentially
> immune to "cloned" candidates, like how B is a clone of D. 

I admit I'm fuzzy on how that part of Cloneproof works.  Guess I'd
better go re-browse electionmethods.org.  :)

-- 
G. Branden Robinson                |     If you have the slightest bit of
Debian GNU/Linux                   |     intellectual integrity you cannot
branden@debian.org                 |     support the government.
http://people.debian.org/~branden/ |     -- anonymous

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: Digital signature


Reply to: