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Re: GRs, irrelevant amendments, and insincere voting



On Fri, 2003-10-31 at 23:18, Branden Robinson wrote:

> I *am* making the assumption that a signficant number of voters will, even
> within a slate of options preferred over the do-nothing default, vote
> conservatively.

Then we can say nothing besides "that is the will of the electorate." 

> So, I am assuming the typical non-activist voter will think "Well, gosh,
> all of these good, and look like at least a marginal improvement over
> the status quo, but in case I'm wrong I'll rank the least disruptive
> options higher".[1]

I doubt this applies to the Debian electorate nearly as much as the
general population. However, even so, that means (given):

	Option A: strike SC 5
	Option B: trivial, editorial change
	Option C: A + B
	Option D: Further Discussion

we're going to get the 'activists' voting CABD and the insecure voting
BCAD. The insecure won't vote against (rank below default) the real
changes if they like them[1]. So, as long as there are sufficient
'activists', I conclude[2] that C will still win.


> If someone can make a good case that my premises above are invalid, then
> I invite them to go ahead in this sub-thread.  I'd be quite relieved if
> our system cannot be "gamed" in the manner I fear.

I fear the alternative is to have someone arbitrarily refuse to put
options on the ballot, and that that would prevent free and fair
elections.

> [2] "Default options", "quorum", and "supermajority" requirements are
>     not native to the Condorcet Method.  In fact, IIRC, the Condorcet
>     Method itself doesn't mandate that there must be only one winner

Condorcet can give an arbitrary number of winners. Cloneproof SSD
attempts to resolve that. Cloneproof SSD is _supposed_ to be essentially
immune to "cloned" candidates, like how B is a clone of D. 

>     among a given set of options.  When SPI held its last board
>     election, we used a Condorcet/CSSD system and picked the *three*
>     most-preferred candidates to fill the three open positions.

     1. if they do, they get what they voted for, and what can you do
        about that?
     2. through much handwaving

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