Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD votetallying
On Tue, 27 May 2003 10:18:18 -0400, Andrew Pimlott <email@example.com> said:
... and also more likely than if a plain Condorcet method were used.
Which complicates the analysis, because it's easy to construct cases
where B voters can beat A with strategy under both Condorcet+SSD and
"approval+Condorcet+SSD". Here is a situation in which they are
sincere strategy by BAD
9 ABD 9 ABD
6 BAD 6 BDA
Hmm. What if I truly want to express the opinion that I like
A, and really and truly find B unacceptable, and thus express my
preference as BDA?
Why is this to be considered "strategic", as opposed to truly
expressing my preference? Why should the voting system be degraded to
refuse to allow me this expression of my belief?
I think I must be missing something major here (sorry:I've had
less than an average of 5 hours of sleep a night for the last 10 days
or so, and in my old age my faculties are failing me)
Yes, you're missing something. Of course the voting system should allow
you to express your belief. However, it should also treat it properly.
He's discussing the situation where people who prefer B, but find A
acceptable (sincere vote would be BAD), lie and claim that they find A
unacceptable (actual vote is BDA). This gives them an *advantage* over
voting sincerely. It's not usually considered desirable for people to
gain an advantage by voting insincerely. (Although it's hard to avoid
all possible such situations with any voting system which always picks a