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Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD votetallying

On Tue, 27 May 2003 10:18:18 -0400, Andrew Pimlott <andrew@pimlott.net> said: 
... and also more likely than if a plain Condorcet method were used.
Which complicates the analysis, because it's easy to construct cases
where B voters can beat A with strategy under both Condorcet+SSD and
"approval+Condorcet+SSD".  Here is a situation in which they are
different:

                sincere         strategy by BAD

                9 ABD           9 ABD
                6 BAD           6 BDA

	Hmm. What if I truly want to express the opinion that I like
 A, and really and truly find B unacceptable, and thus express my
preference as BDA? 
	Why is this to be considered "strategic", as opposed to truly
 expressing my preference? Why should the voting system be degraded to
refuse to allow me this expression of my belief? 
	I think I must be missing something major here (sorry:I've had
 less than an average of 5 hours of sleep a night for the last 10 days
 or so, and in my old age my faculties are failing me)

	manoj
Yes, you're missing something. Of course the voting system should allow you to express your belief. However, it should also treat it properly.
He's discussing the situation where people who prefer B, but find A acceptable (sincere vote would be BAD), lie and claim that they find A unacceptable (actual vote is BDA). This gives them an *advantage* over voting sincerely. It's not usually considered desirable for people to gain an advantage by voting insincerely. (Although it's hard to avoid all possible such situations with any voting system which always picks a winner.) 

--Nathanael
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