Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying
Raul Miller wrote:
> > > I should not be put in this position.
>
> On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 10:49:08AM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> > worst case scenario: everyone feels the way you do. no one votes.
> > two week discussion period resumes, or the amendment is withdrawn.
>
> False.
i was limiting strictly to points where quorum was failed. note i did
not include best case scenarios, (which would be most likely scenarios
for elections such as for the DPL). those scenarios would be ones which
the ideal democratic winner is the election winner.
> With your proposal, the worst case scenario is: I make my choice (either
> to vote or not to vote), the votes are tallied, I find out that my choice
> caused my preferred option to be defeated by an option I ranked as less
> desirable than default.
this gets right back to the definition of quorum.
if the proposal did not use the word quorum, and instead used the term
buy-in, perhaps i would have had less qualms with it. i still feel that
a per-option quorum or per-option buy-in is fatally flawed.
you have stated that a global quorum is flawed.
we have two examples of where gobal quorum is flawed:
Example 1:
9 options + default, R=10. 10 voters. 9 voters vote for different
options, default second, all other options unranked. the thenth voter
votes for any particular option, default second, all other options
unranked.
result: Condorcet would select the option with two votes in favour.
Proposed would select the default option (default != IDW).
Amended would select the option with the two votes in favour.
Example 2a:
2 options + default, R=10. 9 voters. all voters vote ADB.
result: Condorcet would select option A
Proposed would select the default option (default != IDW)
Amended would nullify the entire vote (nullification != IDW)
2b:
2 options + default, R=10, 10 voters, 9 votes ADB; 1 vote BDA
result: Condorcet would select option A
Proposed would select the default option (default != IDW)
Amended woulc select options A
commentary: assume a global quorum. in the first example, only two
people supported the winning option. in the second example, the
additional vote against the option caused it to win.
we have two examples of where per-option quorum is flawed:
Example 1:
2 options + default, R=15. 15 voters. 10 vote ABD, 5 vote BDA
result: Condorcet would select option A
Proposed would select option B (B != IDW)
Amended would select option A
Example 2a:
http://www.mathematik.uni-kl.de/~wwwstoch/voss/comp/quorum.html
4 options + default. R=45. 53 votes.
ABCDE
4x 312-4
9x 3124-
13x 241-3
1x 412-3
2x 12543
9x 131-2
1x 232-1
9x 323-1
2x 312-3
3x 123-1
result: Condorcet would select Option A
Proposed would select Option B (B != IDW)
Amended would select Option A
Example 2b:
http://www.mathematik.uni-kl.de/~wwwstoch/voss/comp/quorum.html
4 options + default, R=45. 54 votes.
ABCDE
4x 312-4
9x 3124-
13x 241-3
1x 412-3
2x 12543
9x 131-2
1x 232-1
9x 323-1
2x 312-3
3x 123-1
1x -1243
result: Condorcet would select Option A
Proposed would select Option A
Amended would select Option A
commentary: in example 1, we have a case where the non-default ideal
democratic winner is discarded before the vote is even tallied. in
example two, a vote that simultaneously votes for B as being prefereable
to all other options, and E as being preferable to default causes E to
make its per-option quorum, which allows A, the ideal democratic winner,
to win.
in the second example, i changed the new vote from the one on the
webpage to indicate that not only is it a vote for B, but it is also a
vote AGAINST A. A is ranked lower than default, and that vote causes A
to win. since this is a new vote, not a changed one, this does not break
the Monotonicity Criterion.
> Now, clearly, we're talking about two different scenarios here (one
> where you choose to vote, one where you choose not to vote). However,
> until the votes are tallied, you can't know which scenario you're in.
we have a few options that we can choose:
1) use a pure condorcet/cloneproof SSD, ignoring all quota and
supermajority requirements. this allows for a minority rule (assuming
rampant voter apathy) and prevents the tyranny of the status-quo
2) use a per-option quorum, which allows for strategic voting (vote the
less-preffered option under default to prevent aiding the other options from
making their per-option quorums)
3) use a global quorum, which rewards voter apathy (as per some
arguments).
4+5) use either quorum method, along with a super majority.
each method is flawed. we must choose which flaws we are willing to live
with. i am willing to live with a minority rule in the case of voter
apathy (this goes along with with the volunteer ideal that no one can
force you to do anything, but you may not hinder those that are doing
the work) and without the tyranny of the status-quo.
so far, we have been discussing options 4 and 5. i believe the ideal to
be 1, and anything that puts us closer to the ideal is better.
the amended proposition puts us closer to the ideal, while doing a
reasonable job of preventing a minority rule, and supporting a tyranny
of the status-quo.
-john
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