Re: Dec 15 voting amendment draft
>>"Aj" == Anthony Towns <firstname.lastname@example.org> writes:
> On Tue, Feb 04, 2003 at 02:12:31PM -0600, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
>> Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
election> , change item 3 to read:
>> 3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes and tallies results
> "Votes and results are not revealed..." ? It's not clear what "tallies"
I have modified it to "Votes, tallies, and results are not
Tallies, originally, a piece of wood on which notches
or scores were cut. Results would mean Bdale Garbee won the 2002
election; tallies would mean Branden Robinson Got X votes, Bdale
Garbee got Y votes.
>> Replace A.3 with:
>> A.3. Voting procedure
>> 1. Each independent set of related amendments is voted on in a
>> separate ballot. Each such ballot has as options all the sensible
>> combinations of amendments and options from that set, and a default
>> option. If the default option wins then the entire resolution
>> procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.
> I think it's a mistake to keep that; exactly how to separate independent
> but related options is a job for the proposers of the resolution and its
> amendment, not the secretary.
I guess I must be dense. All that the item is saying that one
does not tack on unrelated amendments to a GR a la US congress. I do
not see any language as to who is making this decision; apart from
the statement that the secretary creates the ballot. In this case,
the proposers could come together and ask for the secretary to create
a ballot given selected options.
Even if I agree in principle to the fact that deciding what is
unrelated belongs to the proposers, what if the proposers of the
resolution, and proposers of amendments that are not acceptable to
the original proposers disagree?
> "Each resolution and its related amendments is voted on in a single
> ballot, that includes an option for the original resolution, each
> amendment, and, where applicable, the default option."
Hmm. Are we saying there are cases where no default action may
be on the ballot? Wouldn't a "make no changes pursuant to this GR"
always be a reasonable default option?
>> 3. The vote taker (if there is one) or the voters (if voting is done
>> by public pronouncement) may arrange for independent ballots
>> to be held simultaneously, even (for example) using a single
>> voting message.
> So this could die.
I guess this is indeed superfluous.
>> 5. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6 If a
>> quorum is required then the default option is Further Discussion.
> "...otherwise there is no default option."
Is there ever a case that a GR has absolutely no quorum
requirement? Did we not decide that there should always be an option
that people may chose above all others to express a displeasure with
the ballot itself?
>> 6. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
>> of procedure (for example, whether particular amendments should
>> be considered independent or not).
> This could die too.
I would abide by that if that is the consensus. (I disagree,
but I can't take a strong stand on this, seeing that I am the
secretary. I do think we need to provide for a conflict resolution
>> 6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
>> is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
>> only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
>> options, the elector with a casting vote chooses which of those
>> options wins. If there are no options in the Schwartz set,
>> the default option wins.
> Keeping the default option around, lets us kill the last sentence's
> special case, too.
I am not sure I understand. Are we saying that the default
option shall always be in the Schwartz set?
Here is the latest version, with most of the changes aj
suggested, apart from the ones I did not understand.
Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
election], change item 3 to read:
3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes, tallies, and
results are not revealed during the voting period; after the
vote the Project Secretary lists all the votes cast. The voting
period is 2 weeks, but may be varied by up to 1 week by the
Project Leader, and may be ended by the Project Secretary when
enough voters have voted that even if every remaining voter
voted in opposition to the winner the outcome would remain the
same. In this context, we ignore the possibility that people
might want to change their vote.
Under 5.2 Appointment of project leader, change item 7 to read:
7. The decision will be made using the method specified in section
A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure. The quorum is the
same as for a General Resolution (s.4.2) and the default
option is "None Of The Above".
Under 6.1 Powers [of the technical committee], change item 7 to read:
7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee. The Chairman
is elected by the Committee from its members. All members of
the committee are automatically nominated; the committee vote
starting one week before the post will become vacant (or
immediately, if it is already too late). The members may vote
by public acclamation for any fellow committee member,
including themselves; there is no default option. The vote
finishes when all the members have voted or when the outcome is
no longer in doubt. The result is determined using the method
specified in section A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.
Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change item 2 to read
2. The proposer or any sponsor of a resolution may call for a vote on that
resolution and all related amendments.
Replace A.3 with:
A.3. Voting procedure
1. Each independent set of related amendments is voted on in a
separate ballot. Each such ballot has as options all the sensible
combinations of amendments and options from that set, and a default
option. If the default option wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.
2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
have a 1:1 majority requirement.
3. The vote taker (if there is one) or the voters (if voting is done
by public pronouncement) may arrange for independent ballots
to be held simultaneously, even (for example) using a single
4. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6 If a
quorum is required then the default option is Further Discussion.
5. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
of procedure (for example, whether particular amendments should
be considered independent or not).
Replace A.5 with:
If a proposed resolution has not been discussed, amended, voted on or
otherwise dealt with for 4 weeks the secretary may issue a statement
that the issue is being withdrawn. If none of the sponsors of any
of the proposals object within a week, the issue is withdrawn.
The secretary may also include suggestions on how to proceed,
Replace A.6 with:
A.6 Vote Counting
1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on. Not all
options need be ranked. Ranked options are considered
preferred to all unranked options. Voters may rank options
equally. Unranked options are considered to be ranked equally
with one another. Details of how ballots may be filled out
will be included in the Call For Votes.
2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement (Q) any options other
than the default option which do not receive at least Q votes
ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
a. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.
b. An option, A, defeats the default option, D, by a ratio, N,
if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
c. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, it's majority ratio
is S, otherwise it's majority ratio is 1.
4. We construct the Schwartz set based on undropped options and
a. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictl
greater than V(B,A).
b. An option A transitively defeats an option C if A defeats
C or if there is some other option B where A defeats B
AND B transitively defeats C.
c. An option A is in the Schwartz set if for all options B,
either A transitively defeats B, or B does not transitively
5. If there are defeats between options in the Schwartz set, we
drop the weakest such defeats, and return to step 4.
a. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if V(A,X)
is less than V(B,Y). Also, (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y)
if V(A,X) is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than
b. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat
weaker than it. There may be more than one such defeat.
6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with a casting vote chooses which of those
options wins. If there are no options in the Schwartz set,
the default option wins.
"RATIONALE": Options which the voters rank above the default option
are options they find acceptable. Options ranked below the default
options are options they find unacceptable.
With clothes the new are best, with friends the old are best.
Manoj Srivastava <email@example.com> <http://www.debian.org/%7Esrivasta/>
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