Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
> > Which would mean that A.6(7) doesn't really apply to anything at
> > all (since A.6(5) and A.6(6) both would apply before A.6(7)). Personally,
> > I'm uncomfortable with the idea that A.6(7) is a part of the constitution
> > that should never be applied.
> >
> > With a 3:1 supermajority over B, and 60 ABF votes, B dominates A, 30 to 20.
On Sat, Nov 25, 2000 at 11:59:19AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> This isn't the case at all: A.6(7) applies only to the final ballot
> (``If a supermajority is required the number f Yes votes in the *final
> ballot*..''). From A.3(1) and A.3(2), presuming there's more than one
> possible change that could be made (say, "A: Remove non-free" and "B:
> Move non-free to unofficial.debian.org"), they form a set of related
> amendments and are first voted on in a separate ballot, the winner
> of which becomes the final form of the resolution as is `voted on in
> a final ballot', at which point supermajority requirements become
> relevant.
Ah, so you're saying that the vote with options A, B, and F was
an amendment vote, not a final vote. Re-reading your original
missive, and your description, below, that seems the only plausible
thing you could have been suggesting. [I thought you were talking
about alternative final ballots for the same issue -- sorry, I
didn't read what you said carefully enough.]
> > [By the way since you didn't specify it, I'm going to imagine
> > a quorum of 25 on these ballots -- which doesn't affect this
> > particular sample ballot.]
>
> Apparently the quorum would actually be closer to 37 these days. If
> it's a problem, just assume the number of votes are multiplied by 2 or
> 10 or so.
That's kind of ambiguous.
> > > and a final vote something like:
> > > ~80 votes for
> > > ~15 votes against
> > > which is a successful 3:1 supermajority, so it'd pass.
> > Obviously, I disagree. Your interpretation seems to rely on
> > applying the stanzas of A.6 in sequence, which effectively
> > nullifies the higher-numbered stanzas.
>
> I'm applying them as follows:
>
> A.6(1), A.6(2) are definitional, not procedural
>
> From A.3(1) there is an initial vote (or votes) to determine
> which (set of independent) related amendments apply. This vote
> (if necessary) is counted as follows:
[Of course, except for quorum and potential supermajority, this same
counting procedure is used on all votes.]
> A.6(3) is applied to remove all dominated options
But remember that an option is only dominated if strictly more ballots
prefer the dominating option. So, really, you're abusing the terminology
to say that A dominates B, B dominates C and C dominates A. A more
accurate way of describing that situation would be to say that more
ballots prefer A to B, more prefer B to C and more prefer C to A, but
that, strictly speaking, there is no unambiguous preference.
> if there is one option left:
> A.6(4) is applied
> else if there's more than one option left:
> A.6(5) is applied if there is more than one option left
> (in which case, there is an exact tie
> between two or more options, that is n
> votes prefer A to B, and n votes prefer
> B to A)
And, A.6(4) still applies if there is then one option left.
> A.6(6) is applied if A.6(5) didn't result in a clear
> winner [0]
After which A.6(4) still applies.
> (from A.3(1), no quorum is required for this vote)
Yep.
> From A.3(2) there is a final vote to determine whether the resolution
> is passed, which has options "Yes", "No" and "Further Discussion."
A.3(3) indicates that other sets of options are also possible (for
example, combining the amendment ballots and the final ballots), as long
as all the options of all the potential final ballots are represented.
> It is counted as follows:
>
> If a supermajority is required, A.6(7) is applied.
>
> A.6(3) is applied to remove all dominated options.
>
> if there is one option left:
> A.6(4) is applied
> else if there's more than one option left:
> A.6(5) is applied if there is more than one option left
> A.6(6) is applied if A.6(5) didn't result in a clear
> winner [0]
>
> If a quorum is required, A.6(8) is applied (to the original
> vote count, without options dropped, or counts scaled).
Correct.
> (I don't particularly care about the ambiguities in tie situations in
> this case, so the vote numbers I made up simply avoided them).
Ok.
> > > > If that turns out to be too ambiguous, perhaps we need a
> > > > constitutional amendment?
> > > That's the general idea.
> > Do you have a problem with my view -- that A.6(1..8) apply simultaneously
> > (as applicable), or are you going to insist that they be applied in
> > a rigid order?
> Well, if you apply them in random orders you'll get different results.
Ok. But I'm guessing that the real problem was that I was
misunderstanding your underlying point. But now let me ask you: are
you comfortable with A.3(3)?
> A.6(1) and A.6(2), are definitional, so they apply at all times.
>
> A.6(3) and A.6(7) are the only options which change how ballots are
> interpreted, so which order you do those in will change things,
> as will whether you do them. I'm assuming A.6(7) is the first thing
> that done, and it's done in the final vote when a supermajority is
> required. Given A.6(7) is done first, A.6(3) will then remove the
> same votes whenever it is applied.
I prefer to think of these as applying wherever they make sense,
but yours is a perfectly valid way of looking at things.
> A.6(4) and A.6(5) should be applied in order.
Again, this is a perfectly valid way of looking at things. And, again,
I prefer to think of these as applying where they make sense.
> I'm not at all clear on when exactly A.6(6) is intended to apply.
It's pretty clear to me that it only applies where there are the same
number of votes for different options -- that is, tallies where A.6(5)
isn't sufficient.
> It could well be intended as a response to circular ties, which
> means it should apply somewhat concurrently with A.6(3) (if there's
> a circular tie go to A.6(6), if not, apply A.6(3) then A.6(4) or
> A.6(5)), but if so it means a "casting vote" can be equivalent to 10
> or 20 or however many "normal" votes it may need to resolve the tie.
Nope, A.6(5) makes sense for what you're calling "circular ties".
A.6(3) doesn't [because none are dominated], and A.6(6) doesn't
[because it's not really a tie].
> Usually casting votes are considered to have less weight than any
> normal vote, so this doesn't seem entirely reasonable. It's also
> possible A.6(6) is intended to apply only when STV vote fails with all
> options having an equal number of votes, in which case the casting
> vote would be a more normal one, and A.6(6) would come after A.6(5).
Yep.
> So, what I'd assume is something like the following order:
>
> A.6(1), A.6(2)
> A.6(7)
Eh? How can you have an order between definitions? You've
lost me here.
> A.6(3), A.6(4), A.6(5)
> A.6(8)
>
> If all of those fail to select a winner, I don't think it's at all clear
> what the constitution says should happen.
You've lost me here.
> > [Aside: have you ever done any frames-based ai programming?]
>
> No?
Ok, never mind.
> > I don't see how eliminating all the options makes sense. I'm much more
> > comfortable eliminating no options than I am eliminating all options.
>
> Well, sure, but it's not what your comfortable with that matters, it's
> what the constitution says that matters, surely? Isn't that why we have
> it in the first place?
Ok. A better way of tackling this issue is to point out that you were
labelling ballots as "dominating" in a situation where there was no
strict preference expressed in the ballots.
> > I take the "now" in A.6(5) as an important part of the fact that A.6(5)
> > can be applied more than once, and those iterative applications must be
> > in sequence.
>
> I don't think the word "now" is much justification for continually
> repeating the process (it seems to me to simply indicate that those things
> are done in sequence, not how many times they're done), that's not the
> issue: if you *ever* do A.6(3), you're required to immediately discard
> *all* votes in some situations, whether one of them has been chosen or
> not.
Ok. Forgive me for repeating myself (since this is email, and you've
probably already gotten the point by now), but: A.6(3) wouldn't have
applied -- it just doesn't makes sense that you can eliminate the entire
ballot based on a strict preference of one option over another.
> I don't think it's at all clear in the constitution that A.6(3)
> should be ignored in any circumstances, and I don't particularly think
> it's a good idea to have to rely on the secretary's interpretation in
> counting the votes, generally speaking.
Ok, but there's a difference between ignoring the stanza entirely and
simply not to applying it because the situation which it describes
doesn't occur.
> Fortunately, the circumstances where any ambiguities occur are pretty
> rare.
True.
Thanks,
--
Raul
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