Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
> > With a 3:1 supermajority, the 60 raw votes for A are equivalent to 20
> > real votes, so A does not dominate B.
On Fri, Nov 24, 2000 at 10:07:24AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> I'm no longer at all sure what you're talking about then. Note that I'm
> not referring to the system described in the constitution here, but to
> general Condorcet voting schemes.
Ok, but I don't know why you're not sure that I'm talking about
the constitution?
> Consider another possible vote outcome:
> 60 votes A
> 21 votes BAF
> in which case:
...
> and B wins, in spite of everyone being happy with A, and almost everyone
> prefering it.
Yep -- A didn't win by 3 to 1.
3:1 supermajority requires a near unanomous agreement among those voting.
> > Furthermore, you've not specified quorum -- F gets quorum votes,
> > automatically.
>
> I'm not sure where you're getting this from at all. The constitution handles
> quorums as follows:
>
> 8. If a quorum is required, there must be at least that many votes
> which prefer the winning option to the default option. If there
> are not then the default option wins after all. For votes
> requiring a supermajority, the actual number of Yes votes is used
> when checking whether the quorum has been reached.
>
> You don't add pretend votes to the default option. Indeed "adding" votes
> isn't entirely meaningful, in Condorcet systems votes indicate a preference
> amongst options, they don't get assigned to an option.
That's certainly a reasonable way of looking at it.
In any event, you didn't specify a quorum in your example, but you were
talking about a ballot very like the sort specified by the constitution.
If you actually are talking about something relevant to debian (and,
I don't feel too bad interpreting what you write in that fashion --
this list is "debian-vote" after all), then the quorum is relevant in
deciding the outcome.
...
> > > example:
> > > 30 ABC
> > > 25 BCA
> > > 35 CAB
...
> Well, under A.6(3) your first action is to discard all options (since
> they're all dominated by at least one other) and ignore references
> to them in ballots.
If you want to proceed down that route, either you eliminate B (since
A:B domination "dominates" all the other pairwise matchings) or you
postpone handling of this step because it's trivial.
If that turns out to be too ambiguous, perhaps we need a constitutional
ammendment?
> A.6(4) doesn't apply since nothing dominates all others, A.6(5)
> doesn't apply since there aren't any options remaining. A.6(6) could
> apply, I suppose, in which case any of A, B or C would win depending
> on what the DPL decided.
Nothing in the constitution says A.6(5) must happen after A.6(3).
Or, if you did manage to eliminate all options remember the quorum
rule.
> And I'm not trying to describe what the constitution says happens
> because I think it's broken. I'm trying to understand what *should*
> happen.
Then why did you say (near the top) that you're not referring to the
system described in the constitution?
--
Raul
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