Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote:
> > Here's how it would work. Voters rank all candidates or options, but also
> > put in a "cut line" above which all candidates/options are approved, and
> > below which, no candidates/options are approved. One could create a dummy
> > candidate to achieve this if the ballot isn't conducive to the "cut line"
> > idea.
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 07:42:44PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Presumably the "further discussion" option that's on all ballots would
> work for this?
The cut-line would be the constitution's quorum. Essentially, the
quorum is the number of automatic votes for the default option.
[And, yeah, that option is "further discussion" for most debian
ballots.]
> > In really rare cases this might lead to paradoxical situations where the
> > winning option doesn't have the required approval rating, but a lesser
> > option does.
>
> Some possibilities:
>
> a) A clear condorcet winner, that doesn't have enough of a
> supermajority to succeed.
Supermajority basically means that yes votes have fractional
significance. You don't have a clear winner if you don't have
enough votes -- unless you pretend that the yes votes have some
different significance?
> b) A tie for first place (ie, the schwartz set has two or more
> options in it), where "further discussion" is one of the
> equal winners, and it pairwise beats whatever is chosen as
> the real winner.
If this is a true tie, we need a tie-breaking vote (casting vote). That
would mean it's up to the leader for the stuff we're talking about here.
> c) A tie for first place where all the winners beat further
> discussion, but the winner selected by whichever tie breaker's
> used requires a supermajority that it doesn't have, and one
> of the other winners has all the majority it needs (because
> it only requires a smaller one, say)
That wouldn't have been a tie.
--
Raul
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