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Re: ubuntu/snap future



On Vi, 09 apr 21, 06:34:32, riveravaldez wrote:
> On 4/9/21, tomas@tuxteam.de <tomas@tuxteam.de> wrote:
> >
> > Is it really unavoidable? Or just a tad less convenient?
> 
> Well, that's a pretty subjective issue, to be honest... ;)
> 
> > Can you pose one concrete use case where it is unavoidable?
> 
> Not sure if *unavoidable* but I didn't found a better solution at the
> time:
> A client for which laptop I'd installed Debian was in job-need of
> using Skype and Zoom. Her employers wouldn't use anything
> else, so, I was looking for the better/safer way to install such damn
> closed-source pieces of soft (in particular I hate Zoom, but that's
> another subjective issue...) in a for anything else fully libre/secure
> perfectly working Debian system.
> I have no idea what the official .deb packages from Skype/Zoom
> do, so, to minimize exposition and control-lost looked for an easy
> way to 'enclose' what those programs could do, and opted finally
> for Flatpak just to avoid any Canonical late-inconvenience...

Just a general reminder: dpkg will execute all maintainer scripts 
contained in the package as root.

Packages can also contain various other files that can have a big impact 
on system security, like system .service files, cron jobs/timers running 
as root, SUID binaries, etc., even if the program itself is (meant to 
be) run only as a regular user.

If you care about the security of your system inspecting the .deb before 
'dpkg -i' is always a good idea (e.g. with mc or so).

If you are adding foreign repositories you are also trusting them for 
all package updates, for *any* package on your system.

By default APT doesn't care from which repository a particular package 
is coming from, as long as it has the higher version, and that is easy 
enough to manipulate (e.g. with an epoch). A trusted repository could 
then easily substitute *any* package on your system (kernel, init, 
shell, etc.) via package upgrades.

The repository doesn't even have to be evil, as it could always be 
hijacked by a bad actor.


Kind regards,
Andrei
-- 
http://wiki.debian.org/FAQsFromDebianUser

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