Re: How to protect an encrypted file system for off-line attack?
> On 02/26/2009 06:51 PM, Chris Jones wrote:
> >On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 07:11:43PM EST, Ron Johnson wrote:
> >>On 02/26/2009 05:34 PM, Chris Jones wrote:
> >>>Among trillions of trillions, when do you know you've hit the
> >>>jackpot?
> >>When you can decrypt the document with it?
> >You don't have access to the original unencrypted document to compare
> >your output/solutions with, obviously you wouldn't need to decrypt it
> >in the first place.. how do you know when you have successfully
> >decrypted?
>
> The wrong key either (in the case of cryptfs) won't decrypt the file,
> or (alternatively) will create gobbledygook.
I'm not familiar with cryptfs so I do not understand what you mean by
"not decrypting" the file.
Depending on what was encrypted, and given the time, I'm sure I'd be
able to determine, one tentative key at a time, whether the output is
gobbledygook or not.. But even if the original data was in the most
readily legible and understandable form, how do I go about separating
the output obtained with wrong candidate keys in their trillions from
that obtained with the one true key, used when the data was encrypted?
Sorry for being thick.. I don't get it.
Thanks,
CJ
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