Re: Secure APT Key Management
On Wed, Jul 26, 2006 at 04:22:12PM +0100, martin f krafft wrote:
> The way I envision key management is that every Debian machine
> trusts the SPI CA. Then we provide a page to download and verify
> keys, protected by SSL/TLS. Finally, we give the user easy-to-use
> tools to install these keys, and proper error messages from APT that
> will make it obvious what to do.
>
> I don't think it's asking too much of our users to manually declare
> trust for a new release. But we should definitely get rid of the
> one-year-long archive keys, which make no sense. Instead, have a key
> for etch, one for sid, one for etch+1, one for security, and so on.
> The user can then pick which ones s/he wants to trust.
While we're at it, I am very much in favor that we start accepting
binary package signatures again. We were on the right way to assure
package integrity on a package level when our archive suddenly stopped
accepting signed binary packages.
Greetings
Marc
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