Re: Revival of the signed debs discussion
On Tue, 2003-12-02 at 07:00, Andreas Barth wrote:
> * John Goerzen (email@example.com) [031201 17:40]:
> > Even if the attacker could place a new keyring file in the archive,
> > people verifying signatures on signed .debs would not install it, since
> > it would not have the signature of a developer.
> And to be honest: If all debs are signed, and it is easy possible, I
> would restrict accepted signatures at my private machine for the
> keyring package to James - and let me send a mail if there is a
> keyring package signed by any other DD. So, the real danger would be
> if James key is stolen.
Would it be possible && increase security for debian-keyring maintainer
to have a separate, non-network-connected box which which to sign any
new keyring packages (and transfers of the package, for signing,
happening by floppy/ cd/ etc)?
Would that give us long-term certainty that some unknown/ yet to be
discovered root-exploit has compromised our community without us
Debian Enterprise: A Custom Debian Distribution: http://debian-enterprise.org/
* Homepage: http://soulsound.net/ * PGP Key: http://soulsound.net/zen.asc
* Please respect the confidentiality of this email as sensibly warranted.