also sprach Joey Hess <joeyh@debian.org> [2002.11.28.0441 +0100]: > By this I assume you mean it does something like store the passphrase in > non-swappable memory and then when requested use some form of IPC to > feed it into a /usr/bin/gpg process. I assume it hardcodes the path, > which would prevent you (or someone who has access to your account) from > creating a ~/bin/gpg that asks it for the passphrase and dumps it to > stdout. I don't know the details. > That would still let root replace /usr/bin/gpg with such a program > though. root could replace ssh-add with a trojan to get your SSH passphrase. if you don't trust root, don't use the system. > So something like this is of some value, but only manages to narrow > the window that lets someone who has temporary access to, say, > a laptop with an agent running and a passphrase entered, to such > a laptop on which you have used sudo in the last 15 minutes. Correct > me if I'm wrong. You are right. The same applies to everything else though. > q-agent is a PITA to get working with stuff like mutt though, so I do > look forward to using gpg-agent. I just think I'd guard my laptop with > my mail signing key on it about the same no matter which agent I had > running. Right. -- .''`. martin f. krafft <madduck@debian.org> : :' : proud Debian developer, admin, and user `. `'` `- Debian - when you have better things to do than fixing a system NOTE: The public PGP keyservers are broken! Get my key here: http://people.debian.org/~madduck/gpg/330c4a75.asc
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