Re: Misclassification of packages; "libs" and "doc" sections

[tb@becket.net (Thomas Bushnell, BSG)]

Eray Ozkural <erayo@cs.bilkent.edu.tr> writes:

> For a relevant analogy, I'd say that "Suppose the mind is a computational
> phenomenon. In that case, if one devises a theory which explains all
> important phenomena relating to mind in computational terms then that
> theory has to explain all philosophy of mind. And of course, a working
> model would be required :)" In other words, there isn't an impenetrateable
> border between science and philosophy. I suppose that's where our
> real difference lies. [Might it be related to incompatibility of
> our views on theology?]

This is a tautology.  Suppose the mind is a fish.  In that case, if
one devises a theory which explains all important phenomena relating
to fish, then that theory has to explain all philosophy of mind.
Certainly.  But isn't there a lot packed into that initial assumption,
in both cases?

A traditional question in the philosophical notion of category, as
exemplified by the past history of this very thread, is "what is the
correct list of categories", since the categories are (unlike
universals in general) possessed of a very special ontological
priority in thought.

So Aristotle had a list, and Kant says he was kind-of right, but
groping in the dark, and says there are exactly twelve categories,
which come in four groups of three.  He even has a very pretty table.
See page B106 of the first Critique.

Now one could certainly describe, for example, the category of
"Limitation" with the tools of mathematical category theory.  But
mathematical category theory can also describe, say, the category of
abelian groups, or the category of finite topologies.  You could
define a category of fish, of specious arguments, or of Linux
distributions.

This would all be of great philosophical interest (really and truly),
but you have also left, at this point, the traditional notion of the
categories of understanding.  Both Aristotle and Kant, for example,
completely agree that "fish" is NOT one of the categories of the
understanding.  So there is *something* in the notion "categories of
the understanding" which is *not* captured by the mathematical notion
"category theory".  

Is there something which *is* captured?  Of course there is.  But
there is something in the notion "categories of the understanding"
which is captured by the mathematical notions "set" as well, or even
"twelve" (if you are Kant).  

So following your analogy, you seem to hold that one could say
"categories of the understanding just are anything described as a
mathematical category".  And that, I think, is ludicrous, because it's
very hard to find any universal which is *not* a category under that
definition.  

Thomas