Re: cdrtools-2.01a37 ready
On Mon, Aug 23, 2004 at 12:32:10PM +0200, Joerg Schilling wrote:
> Jacob Meuser <jakemsr@jakemsr.com> wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Aug 20, 2004 at 03:49:28PM +0200, Joerg Schilling wrote:
> >
> > > How do you believe that you may run cdrecord without root privs without
> > > compromising the security of the whole system?
> >
> > On OpenBSD, members of the operator group are allowed to reboot the
> > system, change tapes ... normal things that someone trusted to operate
>
> ....
>
> > But having suid binaries gives _anyone_ the possibility of escalating
> > to root. This has already happened to the very software we are
> > talking about.
> >
> > Using the suid bit takes away all the fine grained "access control".
>
> It looks like OpenBSD does not have fine grrained access control but did rather
> add unwanted spacial group behavior into the kernel.
There's nothing "special" added to the kernel. It's just the same old
group "access control" that's been with UNIX-like operating systems since
long ago.
> On Solaris 10, you may use RBAC together with getppriv()/setppriv() to really
> have fine grained role based rights.
>
> On a non "trusted" Variant, there is /usr/bin/pfexec that calls the programs
> with just the rights they need.
>
> Jörg
>
> --
> EMail:joerg@schily.isdn.cs.tu-berlin.de (home) Jörg Schilling D-13353 Berlin
> js@cs.tu-berlin.de (uni) If you don't have iso-8859-1
> schilling@fokus.fraunhofer.de (work) chars I am J"org Schilling
> URL: http://www.fokus.fraunhofer.de/usr/schilling ftp://ftp.berlios.de/pub/schily
--
<jakemsr@jakemsr.com>
Reply to: