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Re: Security Issue of .desktop files



On Tue, 24 Feb 2009 23:36:38 +0000
Matthew Johnson <mjj29@debian.org> wrote:

> On Tue Feb 24 23:44, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> > On mar, 2009-02-24 at 17:33 -0500, Michael S. Gilbert wrote:
> > > here is
> > > a .desktop file that looks like it is iceweasel, but really it
> > > downloads an essentially random file, but I could have made it do
> > > pretty much anything.
> > 
> > Yes, tests may need to be narrowed. That should be part of the spec,
> > though.
> 
> Speaking as someone with a PhD in computer security (and my PhD was in
> this area) I can tell you that trying to use heuristics in order to
> determine if something is 'bad' does not, and it's fairly widely
> recognised cannot, work.

Not only widely recognised, it's proven. People with or without a PhD
might look up the halting problem.

> I firmly agree with Michael that the only good solution is to require
> explicit marking or .desktop files in some fashion.

Isn't downloading something, putting it on the desktop and clicking on
it a strong enough indication of the user's will to execute whatever it
is? If he does all this without blinking once, he surely wouldn't have
any concerns about setting the x bit, if that gets him what he wants,
i.e. to execute the file.

As long as most people think, that embedded scripts, programmes
opening all sorts of crap automatically and .dektop files are
really a great idea, trouble won't be amiss, no matter how many warning
pop-ups, checks or blocks you put in front. I fear the day, when I can
download soft links and disguise shell scripts as pictures.

Cheers,
harry

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