[Date Prev][Date Next] [Thread Prev][Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]

Re: apt gpg keys/signatures



Ritesh Raj Sarraf <rrs@researchut.com> writes:

> Hi Goswin
>
> On Wednesday 07 Oct 2009 10:10:45 Goswin von Brederlow wrote:
>> Which is what I said. You just put the files into /var/lib/apt/lists/
>> under the right name and apt assumes they check out. It doesn't
>> actualy verify them any more once they passed the initial verify and
>> left /partial/.
>> 
>> Then, to get apt to parse the files you placed there you run
>> 
>>   apt_get --no-download update
>> 
>> That should blindly accept the files as trusted.
>> 
>
> This was exactly what I was doing earlier. I was writing them directly to 
> /var/lib/apt/lists. Only with the exception that I was skipping the 
> Release.gpg files.
> The downloaded files are archive files, so I was extracting them and then 
> writing. And then if I did "apt-get upgrade", it would complain of untrusted 
> sources.
> Perhaps if I allowed apt-get to do the extraction, it would have marked them 
> as trusted.

No, trusted is when the Release.gpg file exists. The existance of that
file and only that existance matters.

> Anyway, what I have ended up with looks good. Doing a secure check of the apt 
> updates should be good. :-)
> Actually this will help a lot. Person A gives apt-offline signature to Person B 
> (A friend, running Windows) to download it for him. Person B downloaded 
> something and returned back to Person A. At this point PersonA has an option 
> to be ensured that the data he is going to sync to apt is really from Debian 
> or not.

Yeah, don't forget to actually do check the Release.gpg before copying
it into the apt directory. As said apt never checks the file if you
put it there.

> Regards,
> Ritesh

MfG
        Goswin


Reply to: