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Bug#818367: marked as done (Publish complete CD image signing keys over HTTPS)

Your message dated Fri, 20 Oct 2023 22:03:37 +0200
with message-id <25906.56601.972856.636111@cs.uni-koeln.de>
and subject line closing
has caused the Debian Bug report #818367,
regarding Publish complete CD image signing keys over HTTPS
to be marked as done.

This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.

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-- 
818367: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=818367
Debian Bug Tracking System
Contact owner@bugs.debian.org with problems
--- Begin Message --- 
Package: www.debian.org

https://www.debian.org/CD/verify currently provides fingerprints and
key IDs for the image signing keys, which users can retrieve from a
keyserver. However, GPG fingerprints are merely SHA1 hashes, making
key verification the weakest link in the chain. The TLS certificate,
image hashes and their signatures are already SHA256.

SHA1 is fairly weak nowadays. Fingerprint checking is more of a
stop-gap measure than best practice.

That being said, I urge you to publish the full keys on that page.
This ensures a trust chain at least as good as SHA256, which is very
reasonable for 2016. Users should not rely on checking fingerprints
for keys retrieved over insecure channels.

--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message --- 
We provide the links to the full keys on this page.
Therefore closing.
-- 
regards Thomas

--- End Message ---
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